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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 15-2669
_____________
WILLIAM C. PEAKE
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE,
a department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-01761)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 29, 2016
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 15, 2016)
________________
OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

William C. Peake appeals from an entry of summary judgment in favor of his
former employer, the Pennsylvania State Police, on his claim of race discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the
reasons noted below, we affirm.
I.
William C. Peake is an African American who enlisted in the Pennsylvania State
Police in May 2009. Prospective troopers are required to complete an 18-month
probationary period, composed of 6 months of formal education at the State Police
Training Academy and a 12-month field training program at a patrol station. The latter
includes periodic written evaluations of the trooper’s performance and a General
Investigation Report (the “Investigation Report”). The Investigation Report is conducted
approximately 7 or 8 months into the field training program and is used to determine
whether a probationary officer should be retained. A Probationary Trooper Review Panel
reviews the Investigation Report, and if the trooper is found to be deficient, a separate
review by the Probationary Trooper Administrative Review Panel (the “Administrative
Review Panel” or “Panel”) occurs.1 The latter Panel makes its recommendation to the
Commissioner of the State Police, who makes the final decision regarding trooper
retention.
In November 2009 Peake successfully completed his formal education at the
Police Academy. He was 1 of 4 African Americans of the 88 graduates in his cadet class.
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The Probationary Trooper Review Panel consists of captains and lieutenants. The
Administrative Review Panel is composed of majors and the head of the Human
Resources Department.
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After graduation the State Police assigned Peake, along with 7 white probationary
officers from his cadet class, to the Uniontown, Pennsylvania barracks of Troop B for his
field training. The other 3 African Americans from Peake’s cadet class were assigned to
barracks in Eastern Pennsylvania.
On November 3, 2010, the scheduled end of his probationary period, Peake was
terminated from the State Police. His letter of termination stated “that as a result of [his]
lack of solid job knowledge and basic police skills, along with officer/public safety
concerns, [he] [did] not meet the standards set forth of a Pennsylvania State Police
Trooper.” App. 27. The Commissioner relied on the recommendation of the
Administrative Review Panel in making the decision to terminate Peake. The Panel
found several factors as grounds for dismissal, including mishandled accident
investigations, reports with errors and incorrect information, written and oral
communication problems, and competency concerns voiced by supervisors, colleagues,
and outside agency personnel. Id. at 72–76. The Panel’s recommendations were based
on the Investigation Report conducted by Corporal Michael Irwin, Peake’s immediate
supervisor. It noted several deficiencies and misconduct. First, Corporal Irwin found
that Peake had treated two “reportable” traffic accidents, where an occupant is seriously
injured or the vehicle must be towed, as “non-reportable” accidents. Second, despite
multiple remedial courses in police report writing, Peake continued to turn in reports that
had spelling and grammatical errors and inaccurate factual representations. Third, he
submitted late reports and missed magistrates’ hearings, two of which resulted in charges
being dropped. Fourth, Peake had oral communication problems when excited.
3

The only other individual from Peake’s cadet class to be terminated at the
conclusion of the probationary period was Trooper #9, a white male assigned to Troop M
in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Prior to Trooper #9’s dismissal, however, he was given a
written action plan and extensions that totaled in excess of 7 months. Additionally,
several other probationary officers in Troop B were given extensions to bring up their
performance standards. None of the other probationary officers in Troop B were
terminated at the conclusion of the probationary period. Peake argues that he was given
less favorable treatment than Trooper #9 and the other probationary troopers in Troop B
because he is African American.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Police and
dismissed the action.
II.
The District Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.”
Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). “To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must
demonstrate ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A material fact is one that would affect “the
outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d
410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
4

(1986)). When determining whether there is an issue of material fact, we must review the
record and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Shelton, 775 F.3d at
559.
III.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Claims of discrimination in violation of Title VII are analyzed under the familiar burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of
Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). To do so, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that he (1) was a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position, (3)
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances of the adverse
employment action imply discrimination. Id. at 410–11. “Once a plaintiff under Title
VII establishes a prima facie case, the employer must come forward with a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.” Goosby v. Johnson &
Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981)). “If the employer is able to proffer a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. (citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530 U.S. 2097 (2000)).
5

The District Court found that Peake had not made out his prima facie case for race
discrimination because he had not established his termination gave rise to an inference of
discrimination. Peake v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 12-1761, 2015 WL 3646446, at
*3–6 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2015). Specifically, he had not introduced any similarly situated
comparators and could not show a causal link between his membership in a protected
class and the adverse employment action. Id. Further, the Court concluded that, even if
Peake had established a prima facie case, summary judgment would nonetheless be
appropriate because he was unable to rebut, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
State Police’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination were not a pretext for
discrimination. Id. at *6–8.
We begin by determining whether Peake introduced any valid comparator to
establish his termination as inferring discrimination. An unlawful inference of
discrimination can be shown by identifying a similarly situated individual, outside of the
protected class, who engaged in the same conduct and was treated more favorably.
Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2013). “In order to
determine who might qualify as a similarly situated employee we must look to the job
function, level of supervisory responsibility and salary, as well as other factors relevant to
the particular workplace. This determination requires a court to undertake a factintensive inquiry on a case-by-case basis rather than in a mechanistic and inflexible
manner.” Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 2004).
Peake argues that at least 3 or 4 probationary troopers in Troop B, all of whom
were white, were similarly situated comparators that were treated more favorably than he
6

was. Specifically, he claims that these individuals had a combination of at-fault
automobile accidents, inferior productivity to his own, and instances involving bodily
harm to the public. As noted above, Peake’s dismissal was due to mishandled accident
investigations, deficiencies in report writing, written and oral communication difficulties,
and competency concerns voiced by those who observed him. His dismissal was not
attributable to any of the areas of misconduct by the other 3 or 4 probationary officers in
Troop B. Further, Peake cannot offset his deficiencies by noting areas in which he
outperformed some of his colleagues in Troop B.
Peake also attempts to compare himself to Trooper #9, a white individual from
Troop M in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. He asserts Trooper #9 had deficient driving skills,
difficulties becoming familiar with the geographic area of his patrol region, difficulties
with report writing, trouble in conducting magistrate’s hearings, and had at one time
fallen asleep while driving. Although Peake and Trooper #9 each were deficient in report
writing, their performance problems were dissimilar. The most distinguishing feature
between Peake and Trooper #9, however, is that their evaluative processes were
conducted by different people because they were assigned to different barracks. The
Investigation Report Corporal Irwin produced was a result of previously written
evaluations and interviews with supervisors, coaches, district justices, and other people
with whom Peake worked. It was based on a compilation of information coming from
people who had a direct relationship with Peake and who were able to observe fully his
behavior as a prospective trooper. We find it significant that 13 out of the 19 individuals
interviewed pertaining to Peake’s performance recommended that he not be retained.
7

Indeed, not a single individual recommended retention. Trooper #9 only had 1 individual
out of 16 recommend that he not be retained. Unlike Peake, Trooper #9 had 5 people
recommend an extension of his probationary period. Given that Peake and Trooper #9
were assigned to different barracks, had different supervisors, had different individuals
interviewed with regard to their retention, and had different deficiencies, we conclude
that Trooper #9 is not similarly situated to Peake.
We also agree with the District Court that even if Peake had established his prima
facie case of race discrimination, summary judgment was still in order because he did not
show that the State Police’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for dismissal were a
pretext for racial discrimination. See id. at *6–7.
To survive summary judgment when the employer has
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
action, the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably
either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate
reasons[,] or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative
cause of the employer's action.
Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994)). To discredit the employer’s
articulated reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must “point to
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons such that a reasonable factfinder could rationally
find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the proffered nondiscriminatory
reason did not actually motivate the employer’s action.” Id. at 644 (citations omitted)
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(internal quotations and alteration omitted). To show that an invidious discriminatory
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s
action, “the plaintiff must point to evidence with sufficient probative force that a
factfinder could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [race] was a
motivating or determinative factor in the employment decision.” Id. at 644–45 (quoting
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997)). Examples
include showing that the employer has previously discriminated against the plaintiff, that
the employer has discriminated against members of the plaintiff’s protected class or
another protected class, or that similarly situated people not within plaintiff’s class were
treated more favorably. Id. at 645 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765).
Peake makes several attempts to undermine the State Police’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for termination. He claims termination at the end of the 12month training period was “rare” (Opening Br. at 5). He also asserts that he was put on
desk duty for the final 2 months of his probationary period in violation of the State
Police’s written protocol. Next, Peake contends that he was not provided a written action
plan despite this being common if a trooper was not improving quickly enough. Finally,
he notes a contradiction between the termination letter sent to him, which stated he
lacked “basic police skills,” and a category in his final probationary trooper evaluation
with the same name in which he received a rating of “satisfactory” (Opening Br. at 12).
We agree with the District Court that Peake failed to satisfy either prong of the
Fuentes pretext analysis. As for the first prong, Peake’s reasons demonstrating pretext in
no way concern the negative evaluations of his performance as a probationary trooper.
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The only inconsistency he can point to is his termination letter, which stated he lacked
basic police skills, and his final trooper evaluation form that rated him as satisfactory in
the category of basic police skills. The Court found the terms had different meanings in
their respective contexts. In the termination letter, basic police skills was more general
and referred to the factors the review panels used in recommending Peake’s dismissal. In
the probationary evaluation forms, the term was used in a more specific sense. That it
was rare for a probationary trooper not to be retained at the end of the 12-month training
program, that Peake was not provided a written action plan, and that he was placed on
desk duty, in no way suggests that the State Police’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for termination are “unworthy of credence.” Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644.
With respect to the second prong, Peake does not contend the State Police
previously discriminated against him. Further, he does not claim that it discriminated
against any other member of his class or any other member of a protected class. He does
contend, however, that similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were
treated more favorably than he was. Based on the discussion above, we conclude that
Peake did not present any valid comparator. Therefore, he does not satisfy the second
prong of the Fuentes pretext analysis.
*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
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